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2017 Amendment to Reduce the Statute of
Limitations to File a Claim for an Injury or
Death Benefits Under the Ohio Workers’
Compensation Act
Maximilian Jelen*
ABSTRACT
In 2017, Ohio reduced the statute of limitations to file a claim for an
injury or death benefits under the Ohio Workers’ Compensation Act from
two years to one year. The amendment was launched as a means to
possibly decrease benefits payments made from the State Insurance Fund.
Yet statistics reveal an average of only 1.13% of workers’ compensation
claims in Ohio were filed after one year from the date of injury. Given the
scant percentage of claims filed after one year, the financial impact of the
amendment may be nominal. Meanwhile, the amendment will bar as many
as 2,000 injured workers each year from availing themselves of the right
to receive workers’ compensation. Indeed, those barred are likely to be
injured workers who have been disadvantaged by the workers’
compensation system due to fear of employer retaliation or stigmatization
from co-workers.
This Comment argues Ohio’s reduction of the statute of limitations
to file a claim for an injury or death benefits under the Ohio Workers’
Compensation Act is futile. This Comment draws on economic principles
to evince the amendment has a disparate impact on injured workers and
their families. Finally, this Comment recommends Ohio revert the statute
of limitations to file a workers’ compensation claim for an injury or death
benefits to two years.

* J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University, Penn State Law, 2020.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
Judge E.R. Mills once stated:
Workers’ compensation is a very important field of the law, if not the
most important. It touches more lives than any other field of the law.
It involves the payments of huge sums of money. The welfare of
human beings, the success of business, and the pocketbooks of
consumers are affected daily by it.1

Since the late 1980s, the public policy favoring injured workers in the
United States has been continuously eroded.2 During the late 1980s and
1990s, to reduce workers’ compensation-related costs for employers, state
legislatures enacted major reforms to their workers’ compensation systems
that slashed benefits for injured workers.3 Legislatures justified these

1. Singletary v. Mangham Constr. Co., 418 So. 2d 1138, 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
2. See infra Section II.C. for a discussion on the erosion of the public policy favoring
injured workers in the United States.
3. See infra Section II.C.
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cutbacks by framing their decisions as a “conflict between the policy goals
of efficiency (economic growth) and redistribution (social equity).”4
By popular definition, efficiency theory maximizes the allocation of
resources by weighing the aggregate benefits of a policy against the
aggregate costs of a policy.5 The goal of efficiency theory is commonly
illustrated as concentrating on increasing “the size of the pie.”6 By
contrast, redistribution theory concentrates on the allocation of resources
among individuals (i.e., dividing the pie).7 Social welfare programs, such
as workers’ compensation, are typically understood as redistributive
programs.8
The aftermath of the 1980s and 1990s workers’ compensation
reforms revealed that the efficiency framework state legislatures employed
to underpin their cost-reduction policies was misguided.9 Modern law and
economics principles explain efficiency and redistribution are not wholly
separate, but are actually entangled.10 By relying on an efficiency
framework to rationalize the cost-reducing reforms to state workers’
compensation systems during the 1980s and 1990s, state legislatures
masked decisions that shifted costs to workers and taxpayers—i.e., how to
divide the pie—as “decisions to save overall costs.”11 In a 1998 article,
Professor Martha T. McCluskey examined the illusion of efficiency in
workers’ compensation.12 There, she argued that the efficiency-based
policies upon which the 1980s and 1990s reforms hinged in fact
“undermine[d] the resource-maximizing goals their proponents claim[ed]
to promote.”13 In other words, the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s did not
save overall costs, but merely displaced costs from employers to injured
workers and their families, as well as taxpayers.
A similar efficiency framework was used in September 2017, when
Ohio halved the statute of limitations to file a claim for an injury or death
benefits under Ohio Revised Code Section 4123.84 from two years to only
one year (“Ohio’s Statute of Limitations Amendment”).14 The sole

4. Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ Compensation
“Reform”, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 663 (1998).
5. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 (5th ed.
2019).
6. Id.
7. Id.; see also McCluskey, supra note 4, at 663–66.
8. See McCluskey, supra note 4, at 665.
9. Id. at 716–67.
10. Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100
YALE L.J. 1211, 1225–36 (1991).
11. McCluskey, supra note 4, at 666–67.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 667.
14. H.B. 27, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017).
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purpose of Ohio’s Statute of Limitations Amendment was a possible
“decrease in benefit payments made from the State Insurance Fund.”15
One of the major takeaways from the 1980s and 1990s workers’
compensation reforms was that redistributive considerations cannot be
avoided when weighing a policy that cuts back benefits for injured
workers, even if the policy is framed through an efficiency lens.16 Before
Ohio’s Statute of Limitations Amendment, an average of over 2,000
injured workers per year filed a claim in Ohio for an injury or death
benefits after one year since their injury.17 Under the present statute of
limitations (“Amended Section 4123.84”), those injured workers would be
barred from the right to receive compensation and medical care under the
Ohio Workers’ Compensation Act (“Workers’ Compensation Act”).18 By
comparison, the shortening of the statute of limitations will likely actualize
a nominal fiscal impact for employers.19 Ohio should, therefore, reassess
its reduction of the statute of limitations to file a claim for an injury or
death benefits under Section 4123.84 and revert the statute of limitations
to two years.
Part II of this Comment discusses the origins of workers’
compensation in the United States and how the workers’ compensation
system functions as a quid pro quo between employer and employee. Part
II also details the erosion of the public policy favoring injured workers that
occurred in the late 1980s, and discusses how the statute of limitations
under Section 4123.84 stands apart from other, general statutes of
limitations.20 Part III of this Comment explains why the distinction
between efficiency and redistribution policies is illusory with respect to
workers’ compensation legislation and examines the redistributive
considerations underlying Ohio’s Statute of Limitations Amendment.21
Lastly, Part III recommends that Ohio strike down the amendment and
revert the statute of limitations under Section 4123.84 to two years.22

15. OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMM’N, H.B. 27 COMPARISON DOCUMENT: IN HOUSE
INSURANCE, LSC 132 0003-5, at 13 (2017), http://bit.ly/2Bt8NE2 [hereinafter H.B. 27
COMPARISON DOCUMENT: IN HOUSE INSURANCE]. For a discussion on the State Insurance
Fund, see 1 PHILIP J. FULTON, OHIO WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 14.1 (Matthew
Bender, Rev. Ed., 4th ed. 2017).
16. McCluskey, supra note 4, at 721–22.
17. Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, Claims Filed After 1 Year (1997–2016)
(Special Project SP19-00236, Jan. 24, 2019) (on file with author)[hereinafter Statistics of
Claims Filed After 1 Year (1997–2016)].
18. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4123.01–.99 (West 2018).
19. See infra Section III.B.2.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Sections III.A.–C.
22. See infra Section III.D.

2020

II.

TURNING BACK THE CLOCK

831

BACKGROUND

Ohio’s Statute of Limitations Amendment exemplifies a legislative
act aimed at decreasing workers’ compensation costs for employers. The
tradeoff between benefits for injured workers and workers’ compensation
costs for employers has long been debated.23 To grasp present-day law and
economics policies concerning workers’ compensation, an understanding
of the historical ebb-and-flow of policies favoring injured workers over
employers, and vice versa, is necessary.
A.

A Public Policy Favoring Injured Workers: The Origins of
Workers’ Compensation in the United States

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the socioeconomic landscape of the United States transitioned from an agrarian
society to an urban society.24 As the growth of industry in the United States
surged during the Gilded Age,25 injuries in the workplace became more
prevalent.26 Consequently, a bevy of workplace injury tort litigation
ensued.27 Yet due to common law defenses that insulated employers from
tort liability, injured workers experienced difficulties seeking redress.
Consequently, workers and their families struggled to survive.28
Principles of tort law during the late nineteenth century were rooted
in the concept that “loss from an accident must lie where it falls.”29 Absent
proof of a defendant’s fault or negligence, a plaintiff was unable to recover
damages.30 In the context of workplace injuries, injured workers were
23. See infra Sections II.A.–C.
24. See Thomas O. Wilkinson, Urban Structure and Industrialization, 25 AM.
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 356, 357 (1960).
25. The Gilded Age spanned from the 1870s to the 1890s and signifies America’s
transformation from an agricultural society to an industrial society. Ian Tyrrell,
Connections, Networks, and the Beginnings of a Global America in the Gilded Age and
Progressive Era, in A COMPANION TO THE GILDED AGE AND PROGRESSIVE ERA 381, 381
(Christopher McKnight et al. eds., 2017); see also Paul A. Shackel & Matthew M. Palus,
The Gilded Age and Working-Class Industrial Communities, 108 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST,
828, 828 (2006).
26. See Emily A. Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain: Compensation for Work
Injuries in the United States, 1900-2017, 69 RUTGERS L. REV. 891, 900 (2017) [hereinafter
Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain] (noting that the industrial revolution in America
demonstrated “an extraordinary rate of workplace-caused fatalities and serious injuries . . .
“).
27. See Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain, supra note 26, at 901—02; see
also PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE STATE:
THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 95 (2000).
28. See JOSEPH W. LITTLE ET AL., WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 6–22 (7th ed. 2014);
Daniel T. Doherty Jr., Historical Development of Workmen’s Compensation, in C. ARTHUR
WILLIAMS JR. & PETER S. BARTH, COMPENDIUM ON WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION 11, 11
(Marcus Rosenblum ed., 1973).
29. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 94 (1881).
30. Even if proof of the defendant’s fault or negligence existed, a plaintiff may still
have been unable to recover damages if the plaintiff contributed to his injury. See JOHN
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unfavorably positioned because employers were generally not considered
at fault for workplace accidents.31 Therefore, the loss from an accident laid
with injured workers.32 Additionally, employers found success combatting
tort liability claims relating to workplace injuries through the use of
common law defenses such as assumption of risk,33 the fellow-servant
rule,34 and contributory negligence.35
Estimates reveal that, at most, 15% of injured workers recovered
damages under common law tort liability claims.36 Injured workers and
their families often underwent financial hardship.37 Even when damages
were awarded, the amount was usually inadequate.38 For example, “[t]he
New York Commission found that of forty-eight fatal cases studied in
Manhattan, eighteen families received no compensation; only four
received over $2,000; most received less than $500 . . . . The same
inadequacies turned up in Wisconsin in 1907.”39
Around the turn of the twentieth century, public concern about
workplace injuries in the United States summited.40 President Theodore
Roosevelt stated:
In spite of all precautions exercised by employers there are
unavoidable accidents and even deaths involved in nearly every line of
business connected with the mechanic arts. This inevitable sacrifice of
life may be reduced to a minimum, but it can not [sic] be completely
eliminated. It is a great social injustice to compel the employee, or
rather the family of the killed or disabled victim, to bear the entire
burden of such an inevitable sacrifice. In other words, society shirks

FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS,
AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 43 (2004).
31. See Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain, supra note 26, at 903.
32. See WITT, supra note 30, at 43—44.
33. See FULTON, supra note 15, § 2.5.
34. See Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. 49, 55—61 (Mass.
1842); see also FULTON, supra note 15, § 2.4.
35. See Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain, supra note 26, at 901 n.35
(referring to these three defenses as the “unholy trinity,” and noting that “workers rarely
won tort cases against their employers, at least initially”).
36. See Doherty Jr., supra note 28, at 11 (noting that the data revealed “[70%] of the
injuries were estimated to have been related to working conditions or employer’s
negligence”).
37. See id. at 14 (“These uncompensated accidents often gave rise to dependency and
destitution, with the worker and his family forced to seek relief through various charitable
organizations. This resulting status of enforced pauperization had a dehumanizing effect
upon the injured worker.”).
38. Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of
Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 66 (1967).
39. Id.
40. See Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain, supra note 26, at 903. See
generally UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906) (detailing the troublesome working
conditions and unsanitary practices of the American meat packing industry during the early
twentieth century).
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its duty by laying the whole cost on the victim, whereas the injury
comes from what may be called the legitimate risks of the trade.
Compensation for accidents or deaths due in any line of industry to the
actual conditions under which that industry is carried on, should be
paid by that portion of the community for the benefit of which the
industry is carried on—that is, by those who profit by the industry.41

In response to the “woefully insufficient compensation” the common law
system provided injured workers and their families, workers’
compensation law and a public policy favoring injured workers emerged
in the United States.42
B.

The Purpose of Workers’ Compensation and the Quid Pro
Quo

The motivating philosophy behind workers’ compensation law is to
provide financial and medical benefits to injured workers and their
families with certainty in an efficient manner.43 To achieve this, the
workers’ compensation system is designed as a quid pro quo between
employer and employee.44 The system is a no-fault system (i.e., the
negligence or fault of either party is immaterial), where an employee is
entitled to receive limited benefits45 for a work-related injury.46 In
exchange, the employee waives their right to sue the employer in tort, and
employers’ liability for workers’ compensation costs are secured through
insurance.47 Employers benefit by gaining predictability,48 insulation from
tort liability,49 an insurable risk, and a negligible increase in costs.50

41. President Theodore Roosevelt, Sixth Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1906),
https://bit.ly/2SyEXYR.
42. LITTLE ET AL., supra note 28, at 62; see also FULTON, supra note 15, § 2.8; Spieler,
(Re)assessing the Grand Bargain, supra note 26, at 903–04 (characterizing the adoption of
workers’ compensation laws as a “prairie fire and whirlwind”).
43. See 1 LEX K. LARSON & THOMAS A. ROBINSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’
COMPENSATION § 1.03 (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2019).
44. See Joan T.A. Gabel et al., The New Relationship Between Injured Worker and
Employer: An Opportunity for Restructuring the System, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 403, 406–07
(1998).
45. Generally, “benefits to the employee include cash-wage benefits, usually around
one-half to two-thirds of the employee’s average weekly wage, and hospital, medical and
rehabilitation expenses; in death cases benefits for dependents are provided; arbitrary
maximum and minimum limits are ordinarily imposed.” LARSON & ROBINSON, supra note
43, § 1.01.
46. Id. Injured workers cannot recover damages for pain and suffering or other noneconomic losses. Id. § 1.03.
47. Id. § 1.01.
48. Andrew R. Klein, Apportionment of Liability in Workplace Injury Cases, 26
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 65, 70 (2005).
49. Id.
50. See Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain, supra note 26, at 904—05
(explaining that although employers’ insurance costs increased as a result of workers’
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The workers’ compensation quid pro quo varies by jurisdiction, as
workers’ compensation law is state-specific. Each state legislature weighs
the benefits and drawbacks in deciding what laws to enact and what
compensation should be provided to injured workers.51 The functionality
of workers’ compensation hinges on the balancing of employer and
employee interests.52 Among other things, employers endeavor to keep
workers’ compensation insurance premium costs low.53 One way of
achieving this end is by constraining benefits for injured workers. On the
other hand, an employee must receive sufficient compensation for a workrelated injury. Otherwise, the workers’ compensation system would not
work.54 Alleviating the tension between employers’ insurance premium
costs for workers’ compensation and the amount of benefits allocated to
injured workers was the focus of workers’ compensation legislation during
the late twentieth century.
C.

Erosion of the Public Policy Favoring Injured Workers:
Shifting Tides in the Workers’ Compensation Landscape

During the 1970s and 1980s, state legislation expanded workers’
compensation benefits for injured workers following a report issued by the
National Commission on Workmen’s Compensation Laws (“National
Commission”) in 1972.55 The National Commission concluded that state
workers’ compensation laws were “inadequate and inequitable.”56 The
report included 19 “essential recommendations,” which all sought to
expand injured workers’ benefits.57 Beginning in the late 1980s, however,
the political tide of legislation relating to workers’ compensation laws
diametrically shifted.58 The benefits expansion agenda implemented
during the 1970s and 1980s led to increased workers’ compensation costs
compensation laws, the costs were passed on to consumers and to workers via lower
wages).
51. See Travis J. Foels, Rescuing the Rescuer: Reforming How Florida’s Workers’
Compensation Law Treats Mental Injury of First Responders, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1439, 1445
(2017).
52. See id. at 1449.
53. Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain, supra note 26, at 934–36.
54. Id.
55. Lawrence W. Boyd, Workers Compensation Reform Past and Present: An
Analysis of Issues and Changes in Benefits, LAB. STUD. J., June 1999, at 45, 48–49; see
also McCluskey, supra note 4, at 683–84; Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain, supra
note 26, at 934.
56. NAT’L COMM’N ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAWS, THE REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAWS 119 (1972)
[hereinafter NAT’L COMM’N REPORT].
57. For a more in-depth discussion about the 1972 report issued by the National
Commission, see Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain, supra note 26, at 924–34
(summarizing the findings and analyzing the long-term consequences of the report); NAT’L
COMM’N REPORT, supra note 56, at 119.
58. See McCluskey, supra note 4, at 663.
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for employers.59 Consequently, the workers’ compensation crisis ensued
and helped galvanize political support to reduce employers’ workers’
compensation costs.60
The majority of states in the United States, including Ohio, enacted
“cost-cutting” workers’ compensation reforms during the 1990s.61 In stark
contrast to the benefits expansions during the 1970s and 1980s, state
legislation during the late 1980s and 1990s focused on employer-centric
reforms.62 These employer-centric reforms focused on mitigating
employer costs, primarily through reducing workers’ compensation
premium costs.63
Legislatures justified the employer-centric reforms that decreased
benefits for injured workers by framing the decisions as efficiency-based
policies.64 Efficiency is an economic theory premised on the notion that
we live in a world with scarce resources.65 The goal of efficiency theory is
to maximize these scarce resources.66 In theory, efficiency-based decisions
remove from consideration “sentimentality” and “difficult value
judgments about the relative merit of different groups’ interests.”67 Thus,

59. See id. at 684–90 (noting that while “the increase in employers’ insurance
premiums were widely attributed to rising benefit costs,” other factors ranging from “taxes
and assessments” to rate adjustments based on risks associated with “particular industries
and job classifications” are often overlooked when assessing cost increases).
60. See id. at 677-79 (noting that the workers’ compensation crisis was “the subject
of profound political turmoil”); cf. Boyd, supra note 55, at 46 (explaining that the workers’
compensation reforms during the late 1980s and 1990s were “historically unusual” because
at that time “previous reforms [had] been largely focused on extending the workers’
compensation system . . .”).
61. Wesley J. Trimble, Sweeping Reforms Strengthen Ohio WC Bureau, NAT’L
UNDERWRITER, Apr. 11, 1994, at 11; see also John F. Burton Jr. & Emily Spieler, Workers’
Compensation and Older Workers, HEALTH & INCOME SECURITY FOR AN AGING
WORKFORCE, no. 3, Apr. 2001, at 3, http://bit.ly/2MXZ917 (“Over half of state legislatures
amended their workers’ compensation laws between 1989 and 1997 . . . .”) [hereinafter
Burton Jr. & Spieler, Workers’ Compensation and Older Workers].
62. See McCluskey, supra note 4, at 707 (noting that there was a “profusion of
legislative activity” directed towards “workers’ compensation cost containment bills”).
63. To reduce workers’ compensation-related costs for employers, state legislation
“targeted five areas of concern: (1) heightened compensability standards; (2) limits on
disability payments; (3) limits on medical benefits; (4) limits on litigation and fraud; and
(5) expansion of employer immunity.” Eston W. Orr Jr., The Bargain is No Longer Equal:
State Legislative Efforts to Reduce Workers’ Compensation Costs Have Impermissibly
Shifted the Balance of the Quid Pro Quo in Favor of Employers, 37 GA. L. REV. 325, 327
(2002).
64. See Boyd, supra note 55, at 50.
65. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 11–14 (6th ed. 2012).
66. For a more in-depth discussion about efficiency theory, see generally COOTER &
ULEN, supra note 65, at 7–9. Additionally, for a more in-depth discussion about competing
efficiency theories, see generally Calabresi, supra note 10, at 1221–27 (discussing the
differences between the Kaldor-Hicks test and the Pareto criterion).
67. McCluskey, supra note 4, at 721.
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efficiency-based decisions appear to be impartial, taking into
consideration only “rational and objective cost-benefit calculations.”68
Redistribution policies are commonly juxtaposed with efficiency
policies.69 Redistribution policies are premised on allocating goods and
services to individuals who would otherwise not receive certain resources
under “normal market processes.”70 Social welfare programs such as
Social Security Disability Insurance and workers’ compensation are
examples of redistribution policies.71 From an economic perspective,
policymakers have traditionally perceived redistribution policies as
subordinate to efficiency policies because they “appear to shift resources
rather than to maximize them, and appear to be the result of coercive action
primarily designed to benefit particular groups, rather than the public at
large.”72
Proponents of employer-centric workers’ compensation reform
during the late 1980s and 1990s claimed that the best solution to counteract
high workers’ compensation costs was to implement efficiency-based
policies.73 Thus, policymakers elected to decrease costs for employers by
simply reducing workers’ compensation benefits provided to injured
workers.74 However, the distinction between efficiency and redistribution
policy in the context of workers’ compensation legislation is not as blackand-white as policymakers during the 1980s and 1990s (and still today)
led people to believe.75
In the wake of the 1980s and 1990s reforms,76 the original balance
between costs for employers and benefits for employees has arguably
tilted in favor of employers.77 Additionally, the political influence of
employees has diminished due to weakened union strength and the decline
of traditional manufacturing jobs.78 This power imbalance has paved the
way for continued, piecemeal legislation that decreases workers’
compensation insurance premium costs by curtailing benefits provided to
injured workers.79 Ohio’s decision to halve the statute of limitations under
Section 4123.84 is a case in point of this occurrence. As discussed below,
68. Id.
69. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 65, at 7–9.
70. McCluskey, supra note 4, at 717.
71. Id. at 673–74.
72. Id. at 673.
73. See Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain, supra note 26, at 914–16.
74. See id.
75. See infra Section III.A.
76. For more in-depth discussions about the legislative amendments during the 1980s
and 1990s reforms, see Burton Jr. & Spieler, Workers’ Compensation and Older Workers,
supra note 61, at 1–2; McCluskey, supra note 4, at 705 n.182.
77. See Orr Jr., supra note 63, at 359–60.
78. Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain, supra note 26, at 981.
79. See Michael Grabell & Howard Berkes, The Demolition of Workers’ Comp,
PROPUBLICA (Mar. 24, 2015), https://bit.ly/2wfOJFy.
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Ohio’s Statute of Limitations Amendment may have unjustified, adverse
consequences for injured workers and their families, as well as taxpayers.
D.

Ohio Revised Code Section 4123.84: The Statute of
Limitations to File a Claim for an Injury or Death Benefits

For nearly one century, Section 4123.84 provided for a two-year
statute of limitations for an injury or death benefits under the Workers’
Compensation Act.80 However, effective September 29, 2017, Ohio’s
Statute of Limitations Amendment halved the statute of limitations to just
one year.81 Pursuant to Amended Section 4123.84, a claimant must now
file a workers’ compensation claim “for the specific part or parts of the
body injured” within one year after the date of the injury or death.82 Failure
to do so “forever bar[s]” the claimant’s rights to compensation and benefits
under the Workers’ Compensation Act.83
Caselaw pertaining to Section 4123.84 reveals its unforgiving nature.
The statute of limitations under Section 4123.84 begins to run regardless
of whether an injured worker is aware they may file a workers’
compensation claim.84 In other words, the statute of limitations does not
toll, even if an injured worker is unaware their injury entitles them to the
right to receive workers’ compensation.85 Section 4123.84 is also rigid
when compared to general statutes of limitations. General statutes of
limitations function to preclude the adjudication of stale claims where
“evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared.”86 Conversely, the purpose of the Section 4123.84 notice
requirement87 is to “enable the employers to protect themselves by prompt
investigation of the injuries.”88 Unlike general statutes of limitations,
Section 4123.84 is “jurisdictional and substantive.”89 The provision
implicates substantive rights because the right to receive compensation
and benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act is attendant to the right
80. Joan M. Verchot, New Ohio Workers’ Compensation Injury Statute of
Limitations, NAT’L L. REV. (July 21, 2017), https://bit.ly/2UN2dzJ.
81. H.B. 27, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017).
82. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.84 (West 2018).
83. Id.
84. See State ex rel. Carr v. Indus. Comm’n, 198 N.E. 480, 482 (Ohio 1935); see also
FULTON, supra note 15, § 5.1.
85. See FULTON, supra note 15, § 5.1.
86. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944);
see also 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 2 (2018).
87. See Payne v. Keller, 247 N.E.2d 311, 313 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969); see also FULTON,
supra note 15, § 5.1.
88. Jeffrey V. Nackley, The Initial Filing Period in Ohio Workers’ Compensation
Law, 7 N. KY. L. REV. 33, 34 (1980).
89. Id. at 34. See generally State ex rel. Koval v. Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 141 N.E.2d
306, 307 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956) (explaining the statute of limitations to file a workers’
compensation claim for an injury is “mandatory and jurisdictional”).
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to bring a claim.90 As such, the time period to file a workers’ compensation
claim under Section 4123.84 is a “condition precedent to the right to
maintain [an] action. It affects the right, not the remedy.”91 Halving the
statute of limitations under Section 4123.84 is an unjustified encroachment
on the right of injured workers to receive compensation and medical
benefits.
III. ANALYSIS
Ohio’s Statute of Limitations Amendment was framed as an
efficiency policy: cutback benefit payments to reduce workers’
compensation insurance premium costs.92 By framing the amendment this
way, Ohio legislators were able to depict their decision as a policy
promoting economic growth, rather than a policy that shifted costs from
employers to employees and taxpayers. This Part will thus explore the
conflict between efficiency and redistribution policies from a modern law
and economics perspective and demonstrate that portraying Ohio’s Statute
of Limitations Amendment through an efficiency lens was flawed. Lastly,
this Part will analyze the redistributive factors Ohio should have taken into
consideration and propose Ohio revert the statute of limitations under
Amended Section 4123.84 to two years.
A.

The Illusion of Efficiency-Promoting Workers’
Compensation Legislation

The legacy of the 1980s and 1990s workers’ compensation reforms
neatly shows how efficiency theory can be used as a way to covertly
bypass redistributive considerations.93 This Section will delve into the
illusion of efficiency in workers’ compensation legislation and bring to
light the redistributive considerations Ohio should have weighed when
deciding whether to halve the statute of limitations under Section 4123.84.
Professor McCluskey explained it best:
Efficiency principles have provided crucial but misleading rhetorical
support for policies which actually involve major redistributions of
resources, typically in favor of more privileged groups. Whether

90. Nackley, supra note 88, at 36 (“The general maxim is that a statute of limitations
extinguishes the remedy but not the right. In Ohio workers’ compensation law, the statute
of limitations describes the extent of the rights involved—remedy and right are
coextensive.”).
91. Ry. Express Agency v. Harrington, 88 N.E.2d 175, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 1949).
92. H.B. 27 COMPARISON DOCUMENT: IN HOUSE INSURANCE, supra note 15, at 13.
93. Professor McCluskey explored the conflict between efficiency and redistribution
policies in the context of the 1980s and 1990s workers’ compensation reforms. She
dispelled the notion that workers’ compensation is an efficiency-promoting model. Rather,
Professor McCluskey illuminated that workers’ compensation policies are intrinsically
linked to redistributive considerations. See McCluskey, supra note 4, at 716–67.
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expressed in the technical terms of economists or in more popularized
notions of cost-benefit tradeoffs, a pervasive emphasis on efficiency
ideals has distracted attention from the inescapable political and moral
choices about fair distribution which remain at the heart of problems
such as workers' compensation costs. In the workers' compensation
context, the debate should focus not on the illusion of a neutral
computation of abstract “affordability,” but directly on the needs of
those who stand to win or lose from the reforms.94

In the abstract, efficiency theory assumes that when the status quo of a
market shifts, those who benefit from a shift, “winners,” will
correspondingly compensate others, “losers,” in the market.95 For
example, proponents of workers’ compensation reform during the late
1980s and 1990s stressed that decreasing workers’ compensation-related
costs for employers would benefit both employers and employees, because
insofar as employers’ costs decreased, employees would receive higher
wages.96 Though rhetoric of this kind was politically successful during the
late 1980s and 1990s workers’ compensation reforms, it has not been
economically substantiated.97
Workers’ compensation is viewed as a cost-internalizing process.98
R.H. Coase—considered a luminary in the economic analysis of law and
policy—dispelled the notion that cost-internalization is “an objective
economic guide to efficiency-promoting policies.”99 Coase relied on the
example where a factory is taxed because it emits air pollution that affects
nearby neighboring residents.100 Coase analyzed the question of “‘What is
a cost of what?’—whether the factory pollution is a cost of the factory to

94. McCluskey, supra note 4, at 721–22.
95. See Calabresi, supra note 10, at 1223-28.
96. See McCluskey, supra note 4, at 715.
97. See Kelly D. Edmiston, Workers’ Compensation and State Employment Growth,
46 J. REGIONAL SCI. 121, 138 (2006) (“The relatively low elasticities of employment and
wages with respect to workers’ compensation suggest that recent claims by policymakers,
businesses, and chambers of commerce that workers’ compensation costs are driving away
jobs probably is unwarranted.”). For a more in-depth discussion of Edmiston’s calculations
relating to the conceptual relationship between workers’ compensation costs and
employment, see id. at 126–43. See generally Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain,
supra note 26, at 1013 (explaining that similar rhetoric is still used by advocates calling for
“cutbacks of workers’ benefits”).
98. See, e.g., HERMAN MILES SOMERS & ANNE RAMSAY SOMERS, WORKMEN’S
COMPENSATION: PREVENTION, INSURANCE, AND REHABILITATION OF OCCUPATIONAL
DISABILITY 279–84 (1954). “In the ideal market of neoclassical economic theory, the
market price of a product includes, or internalizes, all costs of the product.” McCluskey,
supra note 4, at 724. By contrast, an externality is a benefit or cost imposed upon one party
by another without compensation. See Pierre Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase’s
The Problem of Social Cost: A View from the Left, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 919, 921 n.6 (1986).
99. McCluskey, supra note 4, at 726; see also Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1–6 (1960).
100. Coase, supra note 99, at 10–13.
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the residents or whether clean air is a cost of the residents to the factory.”101
Coase explained this as a “problem of reciprocal nature,” which can only
be answered by a value-laden decision.102 In other words, there is no
objective economic answer.
As the problem of reciprocal nature103 relates to workers’
compensation, the question becomes “whether work accidents are a cost
workers impose on employers or a cost employers, consumers, or others
impose on workers.”104 Following Coase’s reasoning, the answer to this
value-laden question can only be resolved by a distributive choice between
the interests of employers and employees.105 Despite Coase’s conclusion
that cost-internalizing processes (such as workers’ compensation)
inherently require value-laden decisions, policymakers incorrectly (but
persuasively) portray workers’ compensation legislation as objective
economic decisions. Herein lies the illusion of employing an efficiency
framework to justify workers’ compensation legislation that cuts back
benefits to reduce workers’ compensation costs. Redistributive
considerations are “inevitable” and “essential.”106 The succeeding Section
will examine the redistributive considerations ensnarled in Ohio’s Statute
of Limitations Amendment.
B.

The Redistributive Considerations Underlying Ohio’s 2017
Amendment to Section 4123.84

The question of whether Ohio should have amended the statute of
limitations under Section 4123.84 comes down to a valuation between the
adverse impact of the amendment on injured workers and the benefit
derived by employers.

101. McCluskey, supra note 4, at 727; see Coase, supra note 99, at 2.
102. Coase, supra note 99, at 2; see also Daniel A. Farber, Parody Lost/Pragmatism
Regained: The Ironic History of the Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REV. 397, 416 (1997);
McCluskey, supra note 4, at 726–27.
103. Coase abstractly framed his theory about the reciprocal nature of the problem
as:
The traditional approach has tended to obscure the nature of the choice that has
to be made. The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm
on B and what has to be decided is: how should we restrain A? But this is wrong.
We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to B
would inflict harm on A. The real question that has to be decided is: should A be
allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid
the more serious harm.
Coase, supra note 99, at 2.
104. McCluskey, supra note 4, at 727.
105. Id.; Coase, supra note 99, at 2.
106. Calabresi, supra note 10, at 1228; see also McCluskey, supra note 4, at 722
(finding that within the context of workers’ compensation law and policy, “political and
moral choices about fair distribution” are “inescapable”).
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The Interests of Injured Workers

Statistics produced by the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation
(“BWC”) reveal that from 1997 to 2016, an average of over 2,000 injured
workers per year filed a claim under Section 4123.84 more than one year
after the date of injury.107 Based on these statistics, over 2,000 injured
workers each year could be barred from availing themselves of the right108
to receive indemnity benefits109 and medical benefits110 under the
Workers’ Compensation Act.
Although filing a workers’ compensation claim within one year may
not seem like a difficult undertaking, there are several reasons why an
injured worker may file a claim after one year. Employers may attempt to
prevent or dissuade injured workers from filing a workers’ compensation
claim.111 Though outlawed under Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (“OSHA”) regulations, injured workers may be deterred
from filing a claim for an injury due to “fear of retaliatory termination,
suspension, or discipline.”112 Other reasons an injured worker may file a
claim after one year include: concerns of being stigmatized by supervisors
and co-workers;113 ignorance about the work-relatedness of the injury (i.e.,
“[s]ome workers know they are suffering from an impairment but do not
know the health condition was caused by work”);114 the failure of a

107. Statistics of Claims Filed After 1 Year (1997–2016), supra note 17. From 1997
to 2016, an average of 2,376 injured workers per year filed a claim under Section 4123.84
after one year from the date of injury. Id.
108. See supra Section II.D.
109. Indemnity benefits, also referred to as “income,” “disability” or “cash” benefits,
“are money payments made directly to injured workers to compensate for earnings lost as
a result of compensable injuries. . . . [A]nd are most commonly calculated as a percentage
of the recipient’s average weekly wage, subject to a specified dollar amount.” LITTLE ET
AL., supra note 28, at 498.
110. “Medical benefits cover the reasonable cost of physicians, hospitalization,
medication and other necessary treatment. . . . [A] variety of incidental care and equipment
may also be covered by workers’ compensation.” LITTLE ET AL., supra note 28, at 482.
111. See Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain, supra note 26, at 993.
112. Charlotte S. Alexander, Transmitting the Costs of Unsafe Work, 54 AM. BUS.
L.J. 463, 478 (2017).
113. Lee Strunin & Leslie I. Boden, The Workers’ Compensation System: Worker
Friend or Foe?, 45 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 338, 342 (2004). Relatedly, studies have shown
“[w]orkers do not want to be perceived as complainers or careless.” Emily A. Spieler &
John F. Burton Jr., The Lack of Correspondence Between Work-Related Disability and
Receipt of Workers’ Compensation Benefits, 55 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 487, 497 (2012)
[hereinafter Spieler & Burton Jr., The Lack of Correspondence Between Work-Related
Disability and Receipt of Workers’ Compensation Benefits].
114. Spieler & Burton Jr., The Lack of Correspondence Between Work-Related
Disability and Receipt of Workers’ Compensation Benefits, supra note 113, at 497.
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physician to connect the injury to work;115 and a belief that the injury is
not sufficiently severe.116
Fear of business flight has played an influential role in shaping
policymakers’ attitudes toward legislation that cuts back workers’
compensation benefits to decrease workers’ compensation costs.117
Despite a lack of “any persuasive evidence that workers’ compensation
plays a significant role in business location decisions,” concern about
business flight is a driving force for workers’ compensation benefitcutting legislation.118 In fact, state legislatures have “looked to the statutes
of neighboring states . . . and then amended their laws to match the less
liberal provisions of their neighbors.”119 Relatedly, the former two-year
statute of limitations under Section 4123.84 provided a more liberal time
frame compared to the statutes of limitations to file a claim120 in other
monopolistic jurisdictions.121
If injured workers are unable to receive workers’ compensation, they
may be forced to resort to other government-funded programs, such as

115. Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain, supra note 26, at 994.
116. Spieler & Burton Jr., The Lack of Correspondence Between Work-Related
Disability and Receipt of Workers’ Compensation Benefits, supra note 113, at 497. Studies
reveal “the most consistent factor for a decision to file claims is the severity of the injury,
including whether the worker is off work for more than 7 days or work restrictions are
imposed.” Id.
117. Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain, supra note 26, at 936.
118. Id. But see Timothy J. Bartik, Business Location Decisions in the United States:
Estimates of the Effects of Unionization, Taxes, and Other Characteristics of States, 3 J.
Bus. & Econ. Stat. 14, 20 (1985) (investigating the influence of characteristics of states
and finding that, with respect to unemployment and workers’ compensation, “these
variables’ coefficients have the wrong sign or are insignificant”).
119. Spieler, (Re)assessing the Grand Bargain, supra note 26, at 936.
120. In North Dakota, the statute of limitations to file an original claim for workers’
compensation benefits is “one year after the injury or within two years after the death.”
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 65-05-01 (West 2017). In Washington, the statute of limitations
to file a claim for workers’ compensation benefits is “one year after the day upon which
the injury occurred or the rights of dependents or beneficiaries accrued.” WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 51.28.050 (West 2018); see also Kovachs v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 186 Wash. 2d
95, 102 (2006) (en banc). In Wyoming, the statute of limitations to file a claim for an injury
requires: “an application or claim for benefits is filed within one (1) year after the date the
injury occurred or for injuries not readily apparent, within one (1) year after discovery of
the injury by the employee.” WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-503 (West 2018).
121. There are two methods by which states administer their workers’ compensation
insurance system: a competitive system or a monopolistic system. See FISHBACK &
KANTOR, supra note 27, at 148. The majority of states maintain a competitive system,
where an employer may elect to purchase insurance from either a private insurance
company or from the state fund. Id. In contrast, a minority of states maintain a monopolistic
system, where employers are mandated to purchase workers’ compensation coverage from
the state fund, unless they elect to be self-insured. See id. at 149. For a more in-depth
discussion about the statutory conditions to qualify as a self-insurer in Ohio, see generally
FULTON, supra note 15, § 14.12 (explaining the standards governing the standards whether
an employer may be eligible for self-insurance).
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Social Security Disability Insurance, for redress.122 Though workers’
compensation costs for employers may decrease, the costs will be borne
by injured workers and their families in the short-term, and shifted to
taxpayers in the long-term.123
2.

The Interests of Employers

The benefit to employers of reducing the statute of limitations under
Section 4123.84 is clear: the cost saved from decreased workers’
compensation insurance premiums. It follows logically, the reduction in
claims and the cost saved would correlate to some degree.
As previously discussed, statistics produced by the BWC reveal that
from 1997 to 2016, an average of 2,376 injured workers per year filed a
claim under Section 4123.84 after one year from the date of injury.124
Those 2,376 injured workers represented only 1.13% of the total number
of claims filed within the two-year statute of limitations from 1997 to
2016.125 The percentage of claims filed during the second year of the
statute of limitations was even smaller from 2007 to 2016, where an
average of 0.854% of claims (1,283 injured workers) per year were claims
filed under Section 4123.84 after one year from the date of injury.126
Although the exact calculation of monies saved127 by employers is
unknown, the statistics of claims filed during the second year of the statute
of limitations indicates the cost-savings could be nominal.
C.

The Harms of Ohio’s 2017 Amendment to Section 4123.84
Outweigh the Benefits

Redistributive policies may impact losers and winners
asymmetrically.128 Ohio’s Statute of Limitations Amendment illustrates
such an instance. The nominal fiscal benefit of halving the statute of
limitations under Section 4123.84 pales in comparison to the adverse
impact the amendment has on injured workers and their families, as well
as taxpayers.
The fiscal benefit of Ohio’s Statute of Limitations Amendment to
employers is likely minimal.129 Although the precise cost-savings to
employers is unknown, common-sense dictates the savings are negligible,

122. See Boyd, supra note 55, at 61.
123. Id.
124. Statistics of Claims Filed After 1 Year (1997–2016), supra note 17.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. In addition to possibly reduced workers’ compensation insurance premium
costs, other costs are possibly saved, for example, by way of fewer administrative costs
and legal fees.
128. See Calabresi, supra note 10, at 1223; see also Orr Jr., supra note 63, at 359.
129. See supra Section III.B.2.
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as the number of claims filed after one year from the date of injury
represents a minuscule fraction of the total claims.130 Relatedly, Ohio
employers have benefitted from consistent reductions in workers’
compensation-related costs for nearly the past decade.131 Estimates from
the National Academy of Social Insurance reveal that, between 2011 and
2015, Ohio experienced the fourth-largest decrease in employer costs
among all states.132 And since 2011, the BWC has provided approximately
$8 billion in rebates and reductions in premiums to employers.133 Indeed,
in 2019, the BWC provided employers with a rebate that gave back “$1.5
billion, or 88% of the premiums employers paid for the policy year that
ended on June 30, 2018.”134
Although the above statistics demonstrate Ohio’s Statute of
Limitations Amendment affects only a small fraction of claimants, the
amendment nevertheless encroaches on the rights of over 2,000 claimants,
on average, per year to receive indemnity and medical benefits. As noted
above, those claimants who filed during the second year of statute of
limitations most likely did so due to a shortcoming of the workers’
compensation system—e.g., fear of employer retaliation, stigmatization
from co-workers, ignorance about the work-relatedness of the injury, or
failure of a physician to connect the injury to employment duties.135 Ohio’s
Statute of Limitations Amendment further undermines the ability of
injured workers disadvantaged by the workers’ compensation system to
avail themselves of the compensation to which they are entitled.
If injured workers are barred from receiving compensation because
the statute of limitations expires, they may not receive adequate medical
treatment or time to recover. Consequently, injured workers may be
inclined to work in a full duty capacity when they otherwise would be
convalescing or assigned to a light duty position.136 In such a circumstance,
an injured worker performing duties they otherwise would not presents
additional risks to themselves and their co-workers. Alternatively, injured
workers barred from receiving compensation due to an expired statute of
130. See Statistics of Claims Filed After 1 Year (1997–2016), supra note 17.
131. See CHRISTOPHER F. MCLAREN & MARJORIE L. BALDWIN, WORKERS’
COMPENSATION: BENEFITS, COVERAGE, & COSTS – 2015 DATA 38 (2017).
132. Id. Between 2011 and 2015, employer costs per $100 of covered payroll in Ohio
decreased by $0.30. Id.
133. See Mark Williams, Ohio Proposes $1.5 Billion in Workers’-Comp Rebates to
Employers, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Apr. 24, 2018), https://bit.ly/2I2f7bH.
134. Matthew R. Hunt, Ohio BWC to Provide a $1.5 Billion Rebate to Ohio
Employers, KWGD (July 11, 2019), https://bit.ly/34kd4W8.
135. See supra Section III.B.1.
136. LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 175.03 (2d ed. 2020) (“Light
duty in the context of workers’ compensation typically involves the creation of a temporary
position or short-term modification of job duties for the purpose of providing work to
injured employees who are unable to perform some or all of the duties of their prior
position.”).
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limitations may be unable to continue working and forced to seek
assistance from disability programs supported by the government.137 In
which case, costs would be foisted on taxpayers.138 Further, employers
may be at risk of greater exposure to anti-retaliation lawsuits.139 Insofar as
employers benefit from a reduction in workers’ compensation insurance
premium costs, they may be subjected to additional costs that result from
anti-retaliation lawsuits filed by disadvantaged injured workers who failed
to file a claim due to fear of employer retaliation.140 Ohio’s Statute of
Limitations Amendment realizes a disproportionate impact. The scant
fiscal benefit likely yielded for employers is outweighed by the harms the
amendment imposes on injured workers and their families, as well as
taxpayers.
D.

Recommendation

The principal change this Comment advocates is the return of a twoyear statute of limitations under Section 4123.84. This change could be
accomplished by simply amending Section 4123.84(A), in pertinent part,
to read: “In all cases of injury or death, claims for compensation or benefits
for the specific part or parts of the body injured shall be forever barred
unless, within two years after the injury or death[.]”
Amending Section 4123.84 as such would give effect to the
prevailing interests of injured workers concerning redistributive
considerations interwoven in the duration of the statute of limitations
under Section 4123.84. The fiscal impact of this change on employers
would be minimal.141 Meanwhile, reverting to a two-year statute of
limitations would mitigate financial pressure on injured workers and their
families, as well as taxpayers.142
IV. CONCLUSION
For decades, and still to this day, policymakers have incorrectly
framed workers’ compensation legislation cutting back benefits for injured
workers as efficiency-promoting policies. Ohio’s 2017 amendment to the
statute of limitations under Section 4123.84 appears to be included among
such legislation. Whether framed as a redistribution or an efficiency
policy, modern law and economics principles inform us that workers’
compensation legislation inherently implicates value-laden decisions. This
137. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
138. Boyd, supra note 55, at 61.
139. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.90 (West 2018).
140. Id.; see also Onderko v. Sierra Lobo, Inc., 69 N.E.3d 679, 686 (holding “[p]roof
of injury at work is not an element of a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge under R.C.
4123.90”).
141. See supra Section III.B.2.
142. See supra Section III.C.
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Comment examined the effects of reducing the statute of limitations under
Section 4123.84 while weighing the interests of both employers and
injured workers. This analysis illuminates the nominal fiscal benefit of
halving the statute of limitations under Section 4123.84, which pales in
comparison to the adverse impact the amendment has on injured workers
and their families, as well as taxpayers. Therefore, Ohio should strike
down the one-year statute of limitations under Section 4123.84 and revert
to a two-year statute of limitations.143

143. See supra Section III.C.

